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Abstract 
Only two European countries – France and the UK, both NATO members – have nuclear 
weapons and leading politicians have called for the UK and EU to maintain close military 
and security links post-Brexit. In the context of the Trident renewal debate and the UK 
government’s recently published integrated defence and security review, this article uses data 
from the new UK Security Survey to analyse attitudes towards the possession of nuclear 
weapons amongst the British public. It assesses three key theorical strands in the wider 
scholarly literature on public opinion and states’ use of military force: domestic political 
attitudes, foreign policy predispositions and the ‘gender gap’. We find that all three 
theoretical perspectives contribute to the underpinnings of contemporary public opinion 
towards nuclear weapons. Support for the retention of Britain’s nuclear deterrent is associated 
with being a Conservative Party supporter, favouring Brexit, endorsing superior military 
power worldwide as an important foreign policy goal, wanting to protect the transatlantic 
relationship, and with being male. The article makes a distinctive contribution to the growing 
subfield of research on public opinion and foreign policy, while the findings advance wider 
empirical understanding of contemporary citizen engagement in a key dimension of security 
policy.  
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Britain’s nuclear power status has long influenced its relations with key allies. Close 
collaboration on nuclear arms and related technologies has long been a mainstay of Britain’s 
‘special relationship’ with the USA and has deepened and widened in the post-Cold War 
period.1 Britain’s nuclear power status has been argued to underpin its outsized global role 
and influence, allowing it to ‘punch above its weight’ internationally. As Ritchie has 
observed, the nuclear deterrent ‘reaffirms and in part constitutes the collective identity of 
Britain as an interventionist, pivotal world power’.2 Such consideration of national attributes 
on the world stage are politically salient given the Brexit referendum vote in 2016 
engendered reassessment of Britain’s external priorities and relationships, including the 
means of projecting hard and soft power capabilities. Leading politicians in Britain and 
Europe– such as the German defence minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer – have called 
for retaining close UK-EU military and security links in the post-Brexit era (Wintour 2020).3 
Relations with the EU featured in the integrated review of security, defence, development and 
foreign policy the UK government published in March 2021, in order to identify the range of 
 
1 John Simpson (2013), ‘Nuclear Relationship’, in Steve Marsh and Alan P. Dobson (eds), 
Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge), p. 258. 
2 Nick Ritchie, ‘Relinquishing nuclear weapons: identities, networks and the British bomb’, 
International Affairs, 86:2 (2010), pp. 465-87, (p. 471). 
3 Patrick Wintour, ‘UK must get post-Brexit “defence privileges”, says German minister’. 
The Guardian, (16 January 2020). Available at: 
{https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/16/uk-must-get-post-brexit-defence-
privileges-says-german-minister} accessed 2 November 2019. 
external threats and the capabilities needed to meet them.4 As one of only two nuclear powers 
in Europe, this has security implications for the whole continent. 
Despite the UK’s nuclear deterrent being a key part of wider debates concerning 
national and continental security policy, there has been little in-depth scholarly analysis of 
contemporary public opinion towards nuclear weapons. Bartels (1994) has observed that it is 
important for scholars to study the nature and extent of public support for the ‘cost of 
defence’ in two key respects: in terms of defence spending and the use of conventional 
military force.5 This article extends this focus to a third facet, only applicable to a small 
subset of nuclear states. While there has been considerable focus in recent years on British 
public opinion towards the actual or prospective use of conventional military forces 
 
4 UK Government, ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, 
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’. Available at: 
{https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-
integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy} accessed 26 May 
2021. 
5 Larry M. Bartels, ‘The American Public’s Defense Spending Preferences in the Post-Cold 
War Era’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 58:4 (1994), pp. 479–508. 
overseas,6 and towards defence expenditure,7 there has been comparatively little focus on 
nuclear weapons, despite it being a key and longstanding aspect of British security and 
defence policy. Recent studies which have provided analysis of public opinion towards 
Britain’s nuclear weapons have either focused on the top-line results from polling of the 
 
6 Ben Clements, ‘A micro-level analysis of support in Britain for the war in Afghanistan’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16:2 (2012), pp. 230-50; Ben 
Clements, ‘Public opinion in Britain towards military action in Libya: A micro-level 
analysis’, Politics 32:2 (2012), pp. 109-19; Rachael Gribble, Simon Wessley, Susan Klein, 
David A. Alexander, Christopher Dandeker, and Nicola T. Fear, ‘British Public Opinion after 
a Decade of War: Attitudes to Iraq and Afghanistan’, Politics, 35:2 (2015), pp. 128-50; 
Robert Johns and Graeme A. M. Davies, ‘Coalitions of the willing? International backing and 
British public support for military action’ Journal of Peace Research, 51:6 (2014), pp. 767-
81; Robert Johns and Graeme A. M. Davies, ‘Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations? 
Target States and Support for War in Britain and the United States’, The Journal of Politics, 
74:4 (2012), pp. 1038-52; Jason Reifler, Harold D. Clarke, Thomas J. Scotto, David Sanders,  
Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, ‘Prudence, Principle and Minimal Heuristics: British 
Public Opinion toward the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan and Libya’, British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, 16:1 (2014), pp. 28-55. 
7 Ben Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy: 1945-2017, 
(London: Routledge, 2018); Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, ‘Opinion-Policy 
Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditures in the UK’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 35:4 (2005), pp. 665-89. 
British public,8 looked at continuity and change in views across demographic subgroups,9 or 
provided a general overview of views of the general public relative to those of British 
security elites.10 A recent study that looked at nuclear-related issues (both in terms of 
security, ballistic missiles and energy) focused specifically on belief structures within the 
foreign policy attitudes of U.S. and British public.11 Another study provided comparative 
 
8 Andy Byrom, ‘British attitudes on nuclear weapons’, Journal of Public Affairs, 7:1 (2007), 
pp. 71-7; Nick Ritchie and Paul Ingram, Trident in UK Politics and Public Opinion, (British 
American Security Information Council, 2013). Available at: 
{http://www.basicint.org/publications/dr-nick-ritchie/2013/trident-uk-politics-and-public-
opinion} accessed 6 November 2019; Nuclear Education Trust and Nuclear Information 
Service, British military attitudes to nuclear weapons and disarmament. A research report by 
Nuclear Education Trust and Nuclear Information Service (2015). Available at: 
{http://www.nucleareducationtrust.org/british-military-attitudes-nuclear-weapons-and-
disarmament} accessed 6 November 2019. 
9 Clements, British Public Opinion; Hugh Berrington, ‘British Public Opinion and Nuclear 
Weapons’, in C. Marsh and C. Fraser eds, Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1989), 18-36. 
10 Catarina P. Thomson, Mind the Gap. Comparing Foreign Policy Attitudes of Security 
Elites and the General Public, Whitehall Report 2-18, (London: Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2018).  
11 Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Neil J. Mitchell and Kerry G. Herron, ‘Foreign and domestic 
policy belief structures in the U.S. and British publics’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48:3 
(2004), pp. 287–309. 
analysis of overall attitudes towards nuclear weapons across European nations.12 None, 
however, have provided an integrated, in-depth assessment of whether (and to what extent) 
key factors that shape contemporary attitudes on states’ use of conventional military force 
actually affect public opinion towards Britain’s nuclear deterrent.13  
To redress this gap in scholarly knowledge, this article makes an important and 
distinctive contribution to research on public opinion on contemporary nuclear policy. It does 
this in two respects. First, it uses a new and unrivalled study of British public opinion on 
contemporary security issues - the UK Security Survey.14 The UK Security Survey includes 
key variables identified as playing a role in influencing security policy preferences, enabling 
a direct comparison of the effects of a wide range of factors on public opinion towards the 
retention of the nuclear deterrent. Second, we systematically analyse the explanatory 
contribution of theoretical perspectives situated within the broader literature on public 
opinion and the use of military force to the nuclear arena. These are the role of the elite cue 
 
12 Kjovl Egeland and Benoît Pelopidas, ‘European nuclear weapons? Zombie debates and 
nuclear realities’, European Security (2020). Available at: 
{https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1855147}. 
13 Ian McAllister and Antony Mughan, ‘The nuclear weapons issue in the 1983 British 
general election’, European Journal of Political Research, 14:5-6 (1986), pp. 651-67. 
14 This was research was supported a research grant award held by Dr Catarina Thomson 
(principal investigator) from the Economic and Social Research Council (‘Constraints on the 
Design of Security Policy: Insights from Audience Costs Theory and Security and Defence 
Elites in Britain’; grant number ES/L010879/1). Award information: 
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FL010879%2F1. 
theory relating to party attachments,15 foreign policy predispositions,16 and a ‘gender gap’, 
where men have generally been more supportive of the actual or prospective use of military 
force.17 By examining the relative impact of these theoretical perspectives on a nationally-
 
15 Adam Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World 
War II to Iraq. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Reifler, Clarke, Scotto, 
Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley. ‘Prudence, Principle and Minimal Heuristics’; Matthew A. 
Baum and Henry R. Nau (2009), ‘Foreign policy views and US standing in the world’, 
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of 
Government. 
16 Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz, ‘Models of Attitude Constraints in Foreign Affairs’, 
Political Behavior, 15:1 (1993), pp. 61-90; Brian C. Rathbun, Joshua D. Kertzer, Jason 
Reifler, Paul Goren, and Thomas J. Scotto, ‘Taking Foreign Policy Personally: Personal 
Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes’, International Studies Quarterly, 60:1 (2016), pp. 124-
37; Timothy B. Gravelle, Thomas J. Scotto, Jason Reifler and Harold D. Clarke, ‘Foreign 
Policy Beliefs and Support of Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party’, Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal, 20:2 (2014), pp. 111-30; Timothy B. Gravelle, Thomas J. Scotto and 
Jason Reifler, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes in Transatlantic Perspective: 
Comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany’, European Journal of 
Political Research, 56:4 (2017), pp. 757-76.  
17 Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Gender Difference in American Public Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force, 1982–2013’, International Studies Quarterly, 60:1 (2016), pp. 138-48; 
Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard J. Stoll, ‘Gender Difference or Parallel Publics? The 
Dynamics of Defense Spending Opinions in the United States, 1965–2007’, Journal of 
representative sample of British citizens, this article contributes to building an empirical 
foundation for future work investigating attitudes towards nuclear weapons in nuclear powers 
other that of the United States (U.S.). We find that support of retaining Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent is associated with supporting the Conservative Party, favouring Brexit, endorsing 
keeping superior military power worldwide as an important foreign policy goal, wanting to 
protect the ‘special relationship’ with the U.S., and with being male.  
The article is structured as follows. First, it examines the theoretical perspective of 
elite cues and its relevance for studying public opinion towards nuclear weapons in Britain 
given key features of the issues’ party-political context. Second, it discusses the role of 
foreign policy predispositions as factors that could shape public opinion on the nuclear 
weapons debate. Third, the relevance of the ‘gender gap’ perspective on the use of 
conventional military force is discussed. For each of these theoretical perspectives, testable 
hypotheses are specified. The fourth section reviews existing data on attitudes towards 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, to establish the key characteristics of aggregate public opinion 
over time. The fifth section sets out the distinctive features of the UK Security Survey and 
describes the variables employed in the analyses. The sixth section presents the results and 
discusses the main findings. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for 
the wider field of study, including identifying pertinent areas for further research.   
            
Domestic political preferences and attitudes towards states’ use of military force 
A wealth of recent research has shown how attitudes rooted in domestic politics can shape the 
views of citizens on the issues of military force. As one study noted: ‘In the realm of public 
 
Conflict Resolution, 56:2 (2012), pp. 331–48; Mary-Kate Lizotte, ‘Investigating the Origins 
of the Gender Gap in Support for War’, Political Studies Review, 17:2 (2019), pp. 124-35. 
opinion about important government policies, political parties and their leaders often serve as 
key cue-givers, and citizens are prone to rely on them when asked to consider topics remote 
from their daily experiences’.18 This is particularly the case for foreign and defence policy 
issues, which are, relative to domestic policy concerns, less salient for the British public, both 
generally and for electoral competition.19 Party attachments have been important factors in 
shaping public opinion on recent security policy issues, particularly in post 9/11 British 
military interventions. Reifler et al. find that Liberal Democrat supporters were more likely to 
oppose the use of military force, favouring international co-operation and the advancement of 
humanistic concerns,20 another study found that, for the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, 
Conservative and Labour supporters were more favourable towards military action than were 
backers of the Liberal Democrats.21 Recent research has also shown that party supporters 
vary in their views on particular policy issues, concerning the exercise of ‘soft power’ and 
‘hard power’.22  
 
18 Reifler, Clarke, Scotto, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, ‘Prudence, Principle and Minimal 
Heuristics’, (p. 33). 
19 Clements, British Public Opinion, (p. 46). 
20 Reifler, Scotto and Clarke, ‘Foreign policy beliefs’, (p. 261). 
21 Clements, ‘Examining public attitudes’. 
22 Thomas Raines, ‘Internationalism or Isolationism. The Chatham House–YouGov Survey: 
British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities’, Europe Programme, (London: 
Chatham House, 2015). Available at: 
{https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150130Raines.pdf
} accessed 28 October 2019. 
 We apply insights from elite cue theory – which focuses on the nature of partisan 
conflict at the level of parties and their leaders and assumes ‘that members of the public will 
look to prominent political actors as guides for their positions’ on military force23 – and 
extend these from policy debates concerning the actual or potential use of conventional 
military forces to the debate over possession of nuclear weapons. This theory can be 
particularly useful in contexts where there tends to be unified elite support for a military or 
defence stance, as such elite consensus ‘can signal that an intervention is wise because all 
partisan political actors are able to set aside their differences to pursue a common goal’.24  
 A broad party-political consensus on Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons has 
generally been evident since the early post-war period, reflected in Labour and Conservative 
governments consistently maintaining a nuclear deterrent. This bipartisan agreement 
fractured on two occasions, in the late 1950s-early 1960s and during the 1980s,25 leading to 
clear divergences between the Labour and Conservative parties’ positions at these times. 
During these periods of fracture, the Labour Party suffered from significant internal 
divisions26, encompassed within more general factionalism between the left and right of the 
party. The Conservative Party has generally been more cohesive and united on the issue of 
 
23 Berinsky, In Time of War, (p. 102). 
24 Berinsky, In Time of War, (p. 70) 
 
25 Len Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb: the first 80 years’, International Affairs, 82:4 (2006), pp. 
685-700. 
26 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Volume 2: Labour’s Foreign Policy 
1951-2009. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 
the nuclear deterrent and, more widely, on the use of military force.27 Recent governments 
have upheld this bipartisan consensus, backing renewal of the Trident system on a broadly 
‘like-for-like’ basis. This policy objective was supported by the New Labour governments 
between 1997-2010, and by the Conservative Party, the major partner in a coalition 
administration with the Liberal Democrats between 2010-15, and then governing by itself 
from 2015 onwards. Recent general election manifestos have restated the two main parties’ 
support for renewal of the nuclear deterrent.28 
 The Conservative Party and its leaders have, therefore, over time provided clear and 
consistent cues to their party identifiers: maintaining a strongly cohesive posture supportive 
of the nuclear deterrent, absent major internal disagreement. But the same cannot be said for 
the Labour Party. Recently, also, the elite cues on this issue to Labour supporters have not 
been clear or consistent. While Labour as a party maintained its official policy of supporting 
Trident renewal in recent election manifestos (2015, 2017 and 2019), reflecting the stance 
taken under the last Labour government, the leader of the party in opposition from September 
2015 to April 2020, Jeremy Corbyn, came to the role with long-established views opposed to 
nuclear weapons. Corbyn was the most left-wing leader of Labour since Michael Foot in the 
early 1980s and had close links with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Indeed, 
disarmament has been a popular cause on the left of the Labour Party – as Byrne has noted, 
 
27 Dan Keohane, ‘From Suez to Kosovo: British Political Parties on the Use of Force’, 
Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), pp. 29-48. 
28 A scaled-down and significantly less expensive proposal for Trident renewal has been 
advocated by the Liberal Democrats in their recent manifestos. Amongst the smaller parties, 
the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru and the Greens have long been opposed to Britain 
having nuclear weapons. 
‘CND has [had] an inextricable relationship with Labour’.29 The party’s internal fault-lines 
over the nuclear deterrent, unsurprisingly, resurfaced under Corbun’s leadership.30 In two 
parliamentary votes on Trident, whether as backbencher or as leader, Corbyn – and a 
significant proportion of Labour MPs – voted against renewal, putting him at odds with many 
members of his shadow ministerial team in the latter vote.31  
 
29 Paul Byrne, ‘Nuclear Weapons and CND’, Parliamentary Affairs, 51: 3 (1998), pp. 424-34.  
30 Peggy Hollinger and Jim Pickard, ‘Labour splits deepen over renewal of Trident’, 
Financial Times, 9th February 2016. {Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/268dab92-
ce8f-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377} accessed 14th December 2020.  
31 The two parliamentary votes on Trident, held in 2007 and 2016, registered emphatic 
majorities for renewal (respectively, 408 versus 160 and 471 versus 116 votes). In the first 
vote, under New Labour, all 173 Conservative MPs who took part voted to ‘maintain the 
UK's minimum strategic nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the existing system’. Amongst 
Labour MPs, a significant fraction (88 MPs – 28%) voted against the nuclear deterrent, whilst 
a large majority (230 MPs – 72%) backed the government’s motion. The Liberal Democrats 
voted cohesively, with all 56 MPs who took part voting against the nuclear deterrent.  For the 
second vote, which took place under the Conservative government of Theresa May, 322 
Conservative MPs voted to ‘support replacing the four Trident nuclear missile submarines to 
maintain the UK's continuous at sea nuclear deterrence posture’; a sole Conservative MP 
voted the other way. Amongst Labour MPs, 25% voted against Trident renewal (47 in total), 
while 75% backed the government’s motion (141 MPs). On this occasion, the much larger 
contingent of SNP MPs (52 in all) voted unanimously against renewal. Data taken from The 
Public Whip website, section on  
‘Trident’: {https://www.publicwhip.org.uk/policy.php?id=984} accessed 11 December 2020. 
 Based on insights from Berinsky’s elite cue theory and given the recent positioning of 
party-political elites on the issue, we expect that Conservative Party supporters would hold 
views most supportive of Trident renewal relative to those who affiliate with parties with 
stances strongly opposed to nuclear weapons (such as the SNP and the Greens) or those who 
identify with the Labour Party, which has communicated divergent preferences between the 
official stance and the leader’s views. We examine whether, on the issue of nuclear weapons, 
‘prominent cue-givers can provide structure’ for the security policy opinions of the British 
public.32 The following proposition is tested: 
  
H1: Conservative Party supporters are more likely to be in favour of Britain keeping 
its nuclear weapons relative to supporters of parties with anti-nuclear platforms. 
 
 Another domestic political preference that could affect public opinion on nuclear 
weapons concerns the predominant issue in recent British politics: the 2016 referendum on 
EU membership. Since the referendum, scholars have highlighted how referendum vote 
choice has become as important as, or even more pivotal than, partisanship in predicting a 
wide range of policy choices. The crystallised views of ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’ may be 
consequential for attitudes on other political issues, both domestic and overseas.33 There is 
 
32 Berinsky, In Time of War, (p. 124). 
33 John Curtice, The Emotional Legacy Of Brexit: How Britain Has Become A Country Of 
‘Remainers’ And ‘Leavers’. The UK in a Changing Europe (2018). Available at: 
{https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WUKT-EU-Briefing-Paper-15-
Oct-18-Emotional-legacy-paper-final.pdf} accessed 6 November 2019; Anand Menon, Brexit 
and public opinion 2019. The UK in a Changing Europe (2019). Available at: 
some descriptive evidence supporting the notion that individuals who voted to leave the EU 
tend to be more in favour of Britain keeping its nuclear weapons compared to those who 
voted to remain in the EU.34 The following proposition is examined: 
 
H2: Individuals who voted to leave the EU are more likely than those who voted to 
remain in the EU to support Britain keeping its nuclear weapons.  
 
Foreign policy predispositions and attitudes towards states’ use of military force 
The second theoretical strand examined in this study is the role of foreign policy 
predispositions. Prior research has demonstrated that foreign policy attitudes are 
consequential for views on specific defence and security issues.35 Reifler et al’s study showed 
that the foreign policy views of the British public were structured along two key dimensions, 
which they labelled ‘Liberal internationalism’ and ‘British militarism’, largely akin to the 
core dimensions (cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism) generally found 
to be structuring the U.S. public’s foreign policy attitudes.36 As well as showing that the 
British public hold ‘multidimensional preferences about how a state should navigate and 
respond to challenges in the international arena’, these preferences were also found to be 
‘relevant for domestic political competition’ – that is, views of parties and their leaders.37 
 
{http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Public-Opinion-2019-report.pdf} 
accessed 6 November 2019. 
34 Thomson, Mind the Gap. 
35 Peffley and Hurwitz, ‘Models of Attitude Constraints’.  
36 Reifler, Scotto and Clarke, ‘Foreign policy beliefs’. 
37 Reifler, Scotto and Clarke, ‘Foreign policy beliefs’, (p. 263). 
  Here we examine the effects of three foreign policy attitudes on British citizens’ 
willingness to support the retention of nuclear capabilities. Specifically, we assess the roles of 
militarism, whether the national orientation should favour maintaining close security 
alliances with Europe and protecting the special relationship with the U.S. These are all core 
elements of post-war British foreign policy, so-called ‘pillars’ of the post-war consensus laid 
down by the 1945-51 Labour government and continued by their successors.38 We expect that 
those with more militaristic attitudes will be more likely to agree with Britain’s continued 
possession of nuclear weapons, in order to remain a member of the small subset of states that 
comprise the ‘nuclear club’. 
  
H3: Individuals who consider that maintaining a superior military power worldwide 
should be an important foreign policy goal are more likely to support Britain keeping 
its nuclear weapons relative to individuals who do not. 
 
 Britain has a long history of aligning with Europe and the U.S. on security issues, 
both within and outside the broader umbrella of NATO. Previous research into the structure 
of foreign policy attitudes within the British public found that support for a flagship policy of 
European integration – joining the single currency – was negatively related to a British 
militarism dimension, which ‘taps concerns about British sovereignty and prestige’.39 Based 
on this feature of British public attitudes, we expect that those who value a strong British-
European security alliance will be less likely to support the country’s retention of nuclear 
 
38 Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Consensus Politics: From Atlee to Major. 2nd Edition. 
(Oxford: John Wiley, 1994). 
39 Reifler, Scotto and Clarke, ‘Foreign policy beliefs’, (p. 251). 
weapons. Conversely, given that sustained collaboration on nuclear weapons and defence 
technologies has been a key strand of the transatlantic ‘special relationship’ with the U.S.,40 
we expect that those who value most strongly a security alliance with the U.S. will be more 
likely to endorse Britain’s continued possession of nuclear weapons. We test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H4: Individuals who consider that the security alliance with Europe need to remain 
strong are less likely to support Britain keeping its nuclear weapons than those who 
do not. 
H5: Individuals who consider that the ‘special relationship’ with the U.S. should be 
protected are more likely to support Britain keeping its nuclear weapons relative to 
individuals who do not. 
 
The ‘gender gap’ and attitudes towards states’ use of military force 
The presence of a ‘gender gap’ in relation to attitudes towards states’ use military force is 
well-established in the broader literature.41 Indeed, Eichenberg and Stoll note ‘that it is rare to 
 
40 John Dumbrell, ‘The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11:1 (2009), pp. 64-78 
(p. 65). 
41 Miroslav Nincic and Donna J. Nincic, ‘Race, Gender, and War’, Journal of Peace 
Research, 39:5 (2002), pp. 547-68; Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Gender Differences in Attitudes 
toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990–2003’, International Security, 28(1) 
(2003), pp. 110–41; Val Burris, ‘From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in Between-
Group Differences in Support for Military Action’, Social Problems, 55:4 (2008), pp. 443-79; 
find scholarship in which gender differences on the question of using military force are not 
present’.42 In Britain, studies of public opinion towards different cases of overseas military 
interventions, both in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, have shown differences 
between men and women in support for the use of force.43 Different theoretical perspectives 
have been used to explain presence of this ‘gender gap’ on military force,44 but it is argued 
that women ‘are less supportive of the use of violence to resolve social conflicts and far more 
sensitive to the humanitarian and human costs of war’.45 Cross-national research has also 
 
Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Gender Difference in American Public Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force, 1982–2013’, International Studies Quarterly, 60:1 (2016), pp. 138-48; Yuval 
Feinstein, ‘The Rise and Decline of “Gender Gaps” in Support for Military Action: United 
States, 1986–2011’, Politics & Gender 13:4 (2017), pp. 618-55; Richard C. Eichenberg, 
Gender, War, and World Order: A Study of Public Opinion, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2019);  
42 Eichenberg and Stoll, ‘Gender Difference or Parallel Publics’, 335. 
43 Clements, British Public Opinion; Colin Rallings, Michael Thrasher and Nick Moon, 
‘British Public Opinion during the Gulf War’, Contemporary Record, 6:2 (1992), pp. 376–88. 
44 Deborah Jordan Brooks and Benjamin A. Valentino, ‘A War of One’s Own: Understanding 
the Gender Gap in Support for War’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 75:2 (2011), pp. 270–86; 
Lizotte, ‘Investigating the Origins’; Mary-Kate Lizotte, Gender Differences in Public 
Opinion: Values and Political Consequences. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2020). 
45 Eichenberg, ‘Gender Differences’, (p. 171). 
demonstrated the presence of a ‘gender gap’ in views towards defence spending.4647 In 
Britain, in the 1980s, research showed that women were less likely than men to support 
increased defence spending.48  
         Earlier research into gender and support for nuclear weapons in Britain, when the 
issue was politically salient during the 1980s, produced mixed findings on whether the views 
of men and women differed substantially.49 More recent evidence on the Trident debate has 
shown that men have been somewhat more supportive of like-for-like renewal or the 
maintenance of the independent deterrent.50 Research from the U.S. has to some extent shown 
differences in men and women’s policy attitudes on nuclear weapons,51 as was also the case 
 
46 Richard Eichenberg and Richard J. Stoll, ‘The Acceptability of War and Support for 
Defense Spending: Evidence from Fourteen Democracies, 2004–2013’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 61:4 (2017), pp. 788–813. 
47 Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard J. Stoll, ‘Gender Difference or Parallel Publics? The 
Dynamics of Defense Spending Opinions in the United States, 1965–2007’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 56: 2 (2012), pp. 331–48 (p. 343). 
48 Ivor Crewe, ‘Britain: Two and a half cheers for the Atlantic Alliance’, in Gregory Flynn 
and Hans Rattinger eds, The Public and Atlantic Defense, (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1985), pp. 11-68 (p. 49). 
49 Berrington, ‘British Public Opinion’; Crewe, ‘Britain’; McAllister and Mughan, ‘The 
nuclear weapons issue’; Pippa Norris, ‘Conservative Attitudes in Recent British Elections: an 
Emerging Gender Gap?’, Political Studies, 34:1 (1986), pp. 120-8. 
50 Clements, British Public Opinion, (pp. 198-200). 
51 Lizotte ‘Gender Differences’, 49. 
for gender and views on nuclear and disarmament in Canada52 Based on this existing 
research, the following proposition is tested: 
 
H6: Men are more likely than women to support Britain keeping its nuclear weapons. 
 
Public opinion in Britain towards the possession of the nuclear deterrent: A review of 
previous surveys 
To get a clearer sense of where our work fits within the broader field of public opinion and 
nuclear policy in the UK, this section reviews aggregate public opinion on the matter in the 
past decades. The analysis makes use of evidence from a plurality of sources, both long-
running academic surveys and commercial opinion polls.  
 To gauge the balance of opinion in the early stages of the UK’s development and 
possession of the nuclear deterrent, data from Gallup polling sheds light on the public’s views 
between 1962-67 (given the different wordings and sets of response options used, this 
information and the distributions of opinion are collated in Table 1).53 The questions can be 
broadly split into whether they asked about the making of Britain’s nuclear weapons (1952-
63) or about Britain giving up its nuclear weapons (1961-67). Polls in the 1950s examining 
views on the building of a British nuclear weapons programme all registered majority or 
plurality support for this development. Questions asked between 1960-63, allowing the 
 
52 Jane M. Silverman and Donald S. Kumka, ‘Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward 
Nuclear War and Disarmament’, Sex Roles, 16:3/4 (1987), pp. 189-203. 
53 George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Polls: Great Britain, 1937-75. Vol. 1, 1937-
1964. (New York: Random House, 1976); George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Polls: 
Great Britain, 1937-75. Vol. 2, 1965-1975. (New York: Random House, 1976). 
British public to select between an independent approach to building nuclear weapons or 
using a pooled strategy (via NATO or Europe, or reliance on the U.S.), showed that – 
combining support for these two approaches – there was also majority backing for nuclear 
weapons. The smaller subset of questions in the early-1960s asking whether Britain should 
renounce its nuclear deterrent or not found a broadly similar pattern of opinion. In response to 
each question, a majority of the public expressed support for the status quo – that is, 
disapproving of Britain giving up nuclear weapons – irrespective of the specific framing of 
the question. Across these two sets of questions, support for Britain giving up nuclear 
weapons on a unilateral basis was always a minority viewpoint in the 1950s and 1960s, albeit 
the specific level of support fluctuated. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 Over a longer period of time, a question was included in some of the British Election 
Study surveys since 1964: ‘Do you think Britain should keep her own nuclear weapons, 
independent of other countries?’54 Figure 1 shows the proportions of the British public that 
either supported the retention of the country’s nuclear weapons (either independently or 
within a West European defence system) or did not want Britain to have anything to do with 
them. Over time, very sizeable majorities supported retention in some form – highest in the 
1960s – while favouring the abolition of Britain’s nuclear weapons was always a minority 
view. Support for abolition was highest in 1997, at 26%, when still around three-quarters 
 
54 The data were obtained from the British Election Study Information System, available at: 
{http://www.besis.org/} accessed 11 December 2020. 
wanted Britain to keep its nuclear weapons (74%), which was in the range of 83-90% in the 
earlier decades. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
 Figure 2 shows data from a question asked on several occasions by Ipsos MORI 
during the 1980s and then repeated in 2016: ‘Do you think Britain should keep her own 
nuclear weapons, independent of other countries?’55 Clear majorities of the British backed the 
retention of the nuclear deterrent in the 1980s and again more recently (with the level of 
support ranging between 63-72%). Opposition to retention was usually around a quarter (23-
24%), but somewhat higher in 1986 (31%) and the proportion of those who were unsure was 
less than one-in-ten.  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
 The British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys, between 1983 and 89 – during a period of 
heightened salience for the nuclear disarmament debate – asked the public specifically about 
their preferences regarding multilateral or unilateral disarmament: ‘About British nuclear 
policy. Which comes closest to your own opinion … Britain should rid itself of nuclear 
weapons while persuading others to do the same OR Britain should keep its nuclear weapons 
 
55 The Ipsos MORI data were obtained from the website: {https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-
mori/en-uk} accessed 11 December 2020. 
until we persuade others to reduce theirs?’56 In keeping with attitudes in earlier decades, the 
cause of unilateral disarmament achieved only minority support, ranging between 19-28%. 
The majority view backed multilateral disarmament, with support for this option ranging 
from 68%-78%. Very small proportions did not back either policy or were unsure. Asked the 
same question in the 1994 BSA survey, 23% of the public backed unilateral disarmament, 
with a majority again endorsing a multilateral solution (60%). A small proportion (15%) 
opted for an additional option of always keeping nuclear weapons and just 1% were unsure. 
Another question in the BSA asked: ‘Do you think that having its own independent nuclear 
missiles makes Britain a safer or less safe place to live?’. Generally, majorities affirmed that 
the nuclear deterrent made the country more secure. Between 1983-91, the proportion with 
this view ranged between 52-61%, though it had declined to 46% in 1994, the last time it was 
asked. The opposite viewpoint, always a minority stance, was held by 29-37% of the British 
public during this time period.   
 Overall, when asked to take a view on the country’s nuclear deterrent over the 
decades, the public has tended to show much more support for its retention than for its 
abolition (unless on a multilateral basis). The views of the British public towards Trident 
renewal have been gauged more recently. YouGov asked the following question, covering the 
period 2013-21: ‘Britain's current system of submarine launched nuclear weapons, known as 
Trident, is coming to the end of its useful life and will soon have to be scrapped or replaced. 
What do you think Britain should do when Trident reaches the end of its useful life?’57 As 
 
56 All of the BSA data were obtained from the British Social Attitudes Information System, 
available at: {http://www.britsocat.com/Home} accessed 11 December 2020. 
57 The YouGov polling data were obtained from the website: {https://yougov.co.uk/} 
accessed 26th May 2021. 
shown in Figure 3, there has been consistent majority support for some form of renewal (and 
thus retention) of the Trident nuclear deterrent. Between 54-66% have backed renewal, 
combining those favouring a broadly like-for-like replacement and those preferring a less 
powerful and costly one. In recent years, minorities of the public have endorsed giving up the 
country’s nuclear deterrent, ranging between 18-25%. The levels of support for disarmament 
are, therefore, broadly similar to those seen in the attitudinal data from earlier decades.  
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
 Additional evidence bearing on public attitudes towards Trident renewal comes from 
the British Election Study’s (BES) 2014-23 Internet Panel.58 An identical question was asked 
on three waves between 2015-17: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement? Britain should keep its submarines with nuclear weapons’. The data here are 
presented based on cross-sectional analysis of each wave. Figure 4 shows that the 
preponderant view has been to agree that the country should retain its submarine-based 
nuclear defence system (54-58%), with around a fifth disagreeing (17-19%). The remainder 
either opted for a neutral position (14-16%) or were unsure (10-14%). The balance of opinion 
in the contemporary Trident debate supports an earlier characterisation of the British public 
 
58 Based on analysis of the British Election Study Combined Wave 1-19 Internet Panel 
(Fieldhouse, E., J. Green, G. Evans, J. Mellon & C. Prosser (2020) British Election Study 
Internet Panel Waves 1-19), obtained from: {https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/} 
accessed 11 December 2020. 
as a ‘conservative electorate’ on this issue.59 That is, as in previous decades, public opinion 
has tended to favour the status quo and been resistant to major changes in nuclear defence.  
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
The UK Security Survey 
To understand more about what influences support for maintaining a British nuclear 
deterrent, we conducted the first national British survey to focus on foreign policy attitudes 
and security policy preferences of security experts as well as members of the general public. 
Here we focus on the public opinion component of the survey. The survey has several key 
features which, taken together, make it a rich resource for examining the basis of 
contemporary public opinion in Britain towards nuclear weapons. First, given this focus, the 
survey offers an unrivalled coverage of foreign policy and security issues, aspects of political 
debate which usually only received limited coverage in long-running academic single-country 
surveys such as British Social Attitudes and British Election Studies, which have a more in-
depth focus on domestic politics and societal change. This is also the case for cross-national 
series which feature British samples in their survey waves, such as the European Social 
Survey and the European Values Study, which have featured a limited coverage of foreign 
policy issues. Second, given this coverage of debates relating to Britain’s overseas role and 
security concerns, it allows multivariate analyses to incorporate an assessment of whether and 
how broader foreign policy attitudes are associated with views on the specific issue of nuclear 
weapons, again something which would not be possible by using existing survey series. 
Thirdly, the survey is timely, as it was fielded some months after the second main vote on 
 
59 Berrington, ‘British Public Opinion’, 33. 
Trident had taken place in July 2016, when the party-political contours of the issue would 
have been delineated more clearly to the public. 
     The survey was fielded by YouGov between 1st – 25th April 2017 (before the official 
announcement of the snap general election), with a representative sample of 2,002 GB adults. 
Data were statistically weighted by YouGov to match the national profile of all adults 
(including people without internet access). The data are weighed by age, gender, social class, 
region, level of education, how respondents voted at the previous election, how respondents 
voted at the EU referendum and their general level of political interest. Targets for the 
weighted data are derived from four sources: the census; large scale random probability 
surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey, The National Readership survey and the British 




The dependent variable was measured by asking, ‘how much do you agree or disagree with 
the following statement? Britain should keep its nuclear weapons.’ Responses were captured 
with a standard 5-point Likert scale and included a ‘don’t know’ category. Overall, 31% 
strongly agreed with retaining nuclear weapons and a further 30% agreed. Sixteen percent 
took a neutral position on the issue and 6% stated they were unsure of their view. Similar 
proportions said they disagreed (10%) or strongly disagreed (7%). Among those who had an 
opinion on the issue, we created a binary version of the main dependent variable, which 
directly distinguishes between those who support keeping nuclear weapons (who either agree 
strongly or otherwise) and those who don’t support keeping such weapons (because they 
disagree or remain neutral). Based on that measure we can find that 65% of the British public 
agrees with keeping nuclear weapons while 35% don’t agree with this view. The balance of 
opinion – showing preponderant support for retention of nuclear weapons– clearly fits with 
the weight of the evidence from the review of British public attitudes over time. 
 
Independent variables 
The extensive range of independent variables that can be utilised from the UK Security 
Survey allows us to operationalise key factors from the theoretical perspectives discussed 
above, as well as other socio-demographic variables that could be potentially associated with 
support or opposition for Britain’s nuclear deterrent. The balance of findings from prior 
research indicates that it is important to control for the impact of age60, social grade61, and 
educational attainment.62  
Party identification is measured as a series of dummy variables (Conservative, 
Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, UKIP, Green Party, Plaid Cymru, BNP, not affiliated with a 
political party, or don’t know). Vote choice in the 2016 EU referendum was also 
operationalised as a dummy variable: those who voted to remain in the EU were scored as 1, 
whereas those who voted to leave the EU were coded as 0.  
 Our measure of militaristic foreign policy attitudes was gauged by asking whether 
‘maintaining superior military power worldwide’ should be very important foreign policy 
goal for the country, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not a very important goal 
at all.63 Overall, 28% of respondents considered that this should be a very important foreign 
 
60 Clements, British Public Opinion, Crewe, ‘Britain’, Berrington, ‘British Public Opinion’. 
61 McAllister and Mughan, ‘The nuclear weapons issue’. 
62 Clements, British Public Opinion; McAllister and Mughan, ‘The nuclear weapons issue’. 
63 For more detailed information on these independent variables (and a comparison to 
responses among UK security elites, see Thomson, Mind the gap.  
policy goal, 52% considered it as a somewhat important goal, while 20% said it should not be 
important at all. In order to facilitate a direct comparison of the magnitude of the effects of 
our independent variables on preferences towards keeping nuclear weapons, we also created a 
binary version of this variable (with 80% considering maintaining superior military power 
worldwide as an important goal, and 20% deeming it not an important foreign policy goal).  
The first national orientation item asked: ‘In these uncertain times, our security 
alliances with Europe need to remain strong’. Response categories were measured using a 5-
point Likert scale. Thirty one percent of the public strongly agreed, 45% agreed, 14% neither 
agreed nor disagreed, 3% disagreed, 1% strongly disagreed, while 5% claimed they did not 
know. Among those who had a defined opinion, the binary version of the variable suggests 
that 81% consider security alliances with Europe should remain strong, whereas 19% would 
prefer them not to. The second item in this category asked: ‘It is essential to protect the 
“special relationship” with the United States’. A Likert-scale was used. Overall, 13% of 
respondents strongly agreed, 36% agreed, 26% neither agreed or disagreed, 14% disagreed, 
5% strongly disagreed, and 5% stated they did not know. Among those who had a view on 
the matter, the binary version shows that 52% classified the ‘special relationship’ with the 
U.S. as essential to protect, compared to 48% who did not.64   
 
64 We include a standard feeling thermometer item to gauge attitudes towards NATO, 
measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, as an alternative measure of support for the 
transatlantic security relationship. A value of 100 represents a very warm, favorable feeling, 0 
means a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 represents not particularly warm or cold. The 
scale average was 61. It is included as robustness check in our analysis (Model 3 in the 
Appendix).  
Gender is measured as a dummy variable, scored as 1 for men and 0 for women, 
whereas age is measured as a continuous variable (ranging from 18 to 90; mean was 47 
years). Three measures of socio-economic status are used as control variables: education, 
social grade and personal income. Education is measured as a dummy variable scored as 1 if 
an individual has a degree-level (or higher degree) qualification and 0 if an individual has a 
lower-level qualification or none. A standard social grade measure is used, distinguishing 
among upper and lower middle-class occupations, skilled and unskilled workers, as well as 
pensioners and casual workers.65 Personal income is measured using an ordinal scale ranging 
from 1 (under £5,000 per year) to 15 (£100,000 and over per year). In addition to these 
standard control measures, we also asked about defence spending preferences to include as a 
robustness check in our analyses.66  
 
65 The social grade scheme has been widely used by survey research organisations for opinion 
polling in Britain since the 1960s. The detailed classification is as follows (grade; status; 
occupation): A: upper middle class – higher managerial, administrative, or professional; B: 
middle class – intermediate managerial, administrative, or professional; C1: lower middle 
class – supervisory or clerical, junior managerial, administrative, or professional; C2: skilled 
working class – skilled manual workers; D: working class – semi-skilled and unskilled 
manual workers; E: lowest level of subsistence – state pensioners or widows (no other 
earner), casual or lowest grade workers. The six categories are often collapsed into four 
groupings for the purposes of analysis (AB, C1, C2 and DE), as is the case here. For more 
information, see: {https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/social-grade} accessed 6 
November 2019. 
66 The specific item asked: ‘Do you think the government should spend more on defence, less 
on defence, or about the same?’ Overall, 38% of participants considered that the government 
Results and discussion 
To assess whether our independent variables affect preferences for keeping Britain’s nuclear 
weapons, we estimated five ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models (full results are 
reported in the Appendix). We focus mainly on the results from Model 1 (our main model), 
with the additional model results provided as robustness checks.  Figure 5 summarizes the 
results from Model 1. The circles represent the estimates of the effects of each independent 
variable listed to the left of the figure on the dependent variable (attitudes towards keeping 
nuclear weapons). The whiskers on either end of these circles represent the 95% confidence 
intervals for each estimate. When these intervals include 0, we can conclude that there is not 
a statistically significant relationship between that independent variable and preferences for 
keeping nuclear weapons. Estimates whose confidence intervals lay to the left of the 0 line 
have a statistically significant negative effect on support for keeping nuclear weapons; 
estimates with confidence intervals to the right of this line have a statistically significant 
positive effect.   
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
 Figure 5 shows that most of the independent variables have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of preferring to keep nuclear weapons. The first row suggests that those who voted 
‘remain’ in the EU referendum are less likely to support keeping nuclear weapons relative to 
those who voted to leave the EU. The rows below indicate that supporters of Labour, the 
 
should spend more on defence, whereas 42% stated the government should spend about the 
same, 12% supported spending less, and 7% did not know (Model 4 in Appendix).  
 
Liberal Democrats, the SNP, UKIP, the Green Party and Plaid Cymru are less likely to 
support keeping nuclear weapons relative to Conservative Party supporters (who are the 
omitted reference category, as we want to compare other parties to them, in order to test H1). 
The same is true of individuals who did not know their political affiliation or stated they did 
not support any political party. Knowing that a person supports the British National Party 
(BNP), on the other hand, does not tell us much about that individual’s likelihood of 
supporting the retention of nuclear weapons relative to a Conservative supporter.67  
 We therefore find that political preferences have a significant role to play in affecting 
people’s likelihood of supporting of Britain retaining its nuclear weapons. Identifying with 
political parties with a clear nuclear stance is generally significant in affecting people’s views 
on the UK nuclear programme, lending support for H1 and the role of elite cues in structuring 
citizens’ positions on the debate.68 Our data suggest that supporters of parties that do not take 
an anti-nuclear stance, such as the Liberal Democrats or UKIP, are also less likely to support 
keeping nuclear weapons relative to Conservative supporters. In line with our expectation for 
H2, those who voted to for Britain to remain in the EU are less likely to agree with the 
statement that the UK should keep its nuclear weapons, relative to those who voted to leave, 
net of the impacts for party identification. This provides further evidence of the potency of 
 
67 As a robustness check, we also ran a regression (Model 2 in the Appendix) with a binary 
dependent variable (separating between those who generally want to keep nuclear weapons 
and those who do not or are neutral on the issue). Overall, the effect of the independent 
variables on support for keeping nuclear weapons remains the same except for the effect of 
being a Plaid Cymru supporter (we suspect due to the small number of Plaid Cymru 
supporters in the sample).  
68 Berinsky, ‘In Time of War’. 
views on the Brexit debate for other issues in the post-referendum political landscape, 
concerning both domestic and external policy. 
 As well as political preferences being rooted in domestic politics, we find that views 
on nuclear weapons are also clearly underpinned by attitudes towards core foreign policy 
debates relating to Britain’s international role and relationships. Views on whether 
maintaining superior military power worldwide (this variable is labelled ‘Military’ in Figure 
5) should be an important foreign policy goal have a statistically significant positive impact: 
those who consider it is important for Britain to maintain a superior military power 
worldwide are more likely to agree that the country should retain its nuclear weapons 
compared to those who do not hold these views. This confirms the expectation set out in H3, 
suggesting that both conventional and unconventional force capabilities are thought to be 
crucial for the country being able to maintain such a posture. In terms of Britain’s key 
relationships and alliances in the post-war era, individuals who think that is it most important 
to protect the transatlantic special relationship (labelled as ‘USA’ in Figure 5) are more likely 
to agree that Britain should keep its nuclear weapons, confirming H5.69 This suggests that 
some individuals may perceive the nuclear dimension of U.S.-UK bilateral relations to be 
particularly important to the overall stability of the broader ‘special relationship’ and to be 
particularly beneficial for Britain’s defence capabilities. We find no support for H4, however: 
views on the importance of maintaining close security alliances with Europe do not affect 
preferences on the retention of nuclear weapons. This may be because so few countries in 
 
69 As a robustness check, we ran a regression model using a feeling thermometer towards 
NATO as an alternative (and less direct) measure of transatlanticism (Model 3 in the 
Appendix). We find that the warmer respondents feel towards NATO, the more likely they 
are to agree that Britain should keep its nuclear weapons. 
Europe possess nuclear weapons (just Britain and France), so such capabilities are seen as 
less relevant or even undesirable for those who support security cooperation with the 
continent. Moreover, the EU as an international actor is often perceived to focus on a soft, 
rather than a hard, power role. We note that the impact of this variable is affected by the 
inclusion of the Brexit position variable in the models.70 
 The findings support the well-established ‘gender gap’ on views towards the actual or 
potential use of the military which has been found for the use of conventional force.71 In 
relation to unconventional weapons, men (labelled as ‘male’ in Figure 5) are more likely than 
women to agree with the statement that Britain should keep nuclear arms. This supports H6 
and underlines and extends research which has found recurrent differences in view between 
men and women toward the actual or prospective use of conventional military force. There 
are a number of key theoretical perspectives that have been developed to account for gender 
differences on issue of military force and related issues, which could be used to undertake 
more in-depth analysis of the reasons that underpin women’s greater opposition to the 
retention of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Lizotte underlines that when such weapons were 
being developed in the Cold-War, women were less supportive of the development and 
existence of nuclear armaments’.72 Lizotte claims that women espouse empathetic pro-social 
values, such that, when they ‘think about the international use of force, they may think about 
innocent civilians being killed or suffering as the result of the destruction that occurs during 
 
70 Model 5 in the Appendix does not include the vote in the EU referendum variable. In this 
case, wanting to maintain close a close security relationship with Europe has a significant 
negative effect on the likelihood of supporting keeping nuclear weapons.  
71 Eichenberg, ‘Gender Difference’, Gender, War, and World Order. 
72 Lizotte, Gender Differences, (p. 49).   
war.’73 In the nuclear realm, it is possible that such concerns are magnified given the 
destructive potential involved. Clearly, this is an area where more research is needed, linking 
security policy preferences more directly to measures of pro-social values, such as 
egalitarianism and universalism. 
 Other socio-demographic variables have no significant impact on contemporary views 
of nuclear weapons. Education does not have a statistically-significant effect – in other 
words, net of other explanatory factors, those educated to degree level or higher do not differ 
in their views from those with lower-level or no formal qualifications – and neither does 
social grade or income. Socio-economic factors, taken together, do little to differentiate 
contemporary attitudes towards Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons. Age also did not 
differentiate contemporary views on nuclear weapons, based on the evidence presented here. 
Finally, auxiliary statistical analyses (Model 4 in the Appendix) suggest that individuals who 
are in favour of increasing defence spending are more likely to support retaining Britain’s 




This article has used an important new survey of the public’s views on security policies to 
identify the sources of support or opposition to Britain’s continued possession of nuclear 
weapons. This is currently a live issue in relation to the onging debate over renewing the 
Trident nuclear-based missile system and the recently-announced shift in policy, resulting 
from the government’s integrated review of Britain’s role in the world, whereby the self-
 
73 Lizotte, Gender Differences, (p. 59). 
imposed cap on the country’s weapons stockpile was raised from 180 to 260 warheads.74 It 
extended the empirical study of Bartels’ (1994) conceptualisation of public support for the 
‘cost of defence’, extending this focus to a third facet – unconventional forces – that of 
having a nuclear deterrent, a key component of security policy in the post-war period. The 
article showcased new empirical findings for scholarly research into public opinion and 
foreign policy, integrating theories of elite cues, foreign policy predispositions and the 
‘gender gap’ on the use of military force, and applying them to the nuclear arena. The article 
makes a distinctive contribution to the rapidly growing subfield of public opinion and foreign 
policy, contributing to the under-researched study of such dynamics in nuclear states other 
than the U.S. 
 We find that factors from each of three theoretical perspectives contributed to the 
underpinnings of contemporary attitudes towards nuclear weapons. In terms of domestic 
political attitudes, support for the retention of Britain’s nuclear deterrent was more likely 
amongst Conservative Party supporters and individuals favouring Brexit. Based on foreign 
policy predispositions, backing for the deterrent was related to endorsing superior military 
power worldwide as an important foreign policy goal and support for the transatlantic 
relationship. Clearly, the recurring ‘gender gap’ found on state use of conventional military 
force extends to Britain’s nuclear force capabilities, with men more in favour of retaining the 
nuclear deterrent than women.  
 
74 H. Warrell and G. Parker (2021), ‘Defence and security review sets out Global Britain’s 
balancing act’, Financial Times, March 16th. Available at: 
{https://www.ft.com/content/d4adee66-0b20-4c8d-9451-548a283485b2} accessed 26 May 
2021. 
 While this study has redressed some significant limitations in scholarly knowledge of 
British public opinion on the nuclear deterrent debate, it should also invigorate and encourage 
further work in this important arena. Two areas are particularly noteworthy. First, both 
quantitative and qualitative studies could investigate the British public’s views on nuclear 
strategy and doctrine, complementing this study’s focus on attitudes towards the possession 
of such weapons. What are the British public’s preferences regarding under what 
circumstances should use of nuclear weapons be permissible or not? Second, further work is 
needed to probe in more depth the underlying reasons why citizens in Britain support or 
oppose Trident renewal and – given the recent shift in policy noted above, which seems to go 
against long-standing support for working towards multilateral disarmament in the post-Cold 
War era – to gauge the extent of popular endorsement for augmenting the country’s stock of 
nuclear weapons. It would be instructive to examine to what extent (and amongst which types 
of societal groups), are some common objections to the nuclear deterrent based on: moral or 
ethical considerations relating to the nature of such weapons and their impacts if used; issues 
relating to the burdens to public finances of funding the development and maintenance of 
nuclear weapons and the spending foregone for other areas of government expenditure; or 
their (in)appropriateness for Britain’s national security and defence capabilities given its 








Figure 1 Public opinion towards Britain keeping nuclear weapons, 1964-97 
 
Source: Compiled from the British Election Studies Information System 
(http://www.besis.org/Home). 
Note: ‘Retain nuclear weapons’ combines the percentage stating ‘Britain should keep her 
own nuclear weapons’ and the percentage stating ‘Britain should have nuclear weapons only 
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Retain nuclear weapons Have nothing to do with nuclear weapons
Figure 2 Public opinion towards Britain getting rid of its nuclear weapons even if other 
countries keep theirs, 1981-2016 
 
Source: Compiled from the Ipsos MORI website (https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk). 
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Figure 3 Public opinion towards the renewal of Trident, 2013-21 
 
Source: Compiled from YouGov polling data (https://yougov.co.uk/). 
Note: The ‘Retain nuclear deterrent’ category combines the percentage choosing 'Britain 
should replace Trident with an equally powerful nuclear missile system' and the percentage 
choosing 'Britain should retain a nuclear missile system, but it should be less powerful and 














































































Retain nuclear deterrent Give up nuclear weapons Don’t know
Figure 4 Public opinion towards Britain keeping submarines with nuclear weapon, 2015-17 
 

























Strongly agree or agree Neither Disagree or strongly disagree Don't know
Figure 5 Effects of political preferences, foreign policy attitudes, and ‘gender gap’ on attitudes 
toward keeping nuclear weapons 
 
Coefficient estimates. Figure created using the STATA coeplot package (Jann 2014). Complete 
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Table 1 Public opinion towards Britain’s nuclear deterrent, 1952-67 
Date Question wording Response option and % distribution 
Making nuclear weapons 
03/1952 Do you approve or disapprove of Great Britain making 
the atom bomb? 
Approve: 60 Disapprove: 22 Don't know: 12 
02/1955 Do you approve or disapprove of the government's 
decision to make H-bombs and to be prepared to use 
them in the event of war between Russia and the West? 
Approve: 53 Disapprove: 31 Don't know: 16 
03/1955 Do you think that we should or should not make the H-
Bomb? 
Should: 48 Should not: 43 Don't know: 9 
04/1955 Do you think that we should or should not make the H-
Bomb? 
Should: 54 Should not: 32 Don't know: 14 




regardless of other 
countries having 
them: 17 
Stop making nuclear weapons 
and encourage countries like 
France to stop all efforts to 
have nuclear bombs: 12 
Stop making nuclear weapons 
only if America and Russia as 
well as other countries also stop 
making them: 61 
Don't know: 10 
04/1960 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons: 31 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 19 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 26 
Don't know: 24 
05/1960 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons:24 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 27 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 33 
Don't know: 16 
07/1960 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons: 28 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 27 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 34 
Don't know: 11 
09/1960 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons: 36 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 31 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 21 
Don't know: 12 
10/1960 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons: 37 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 32 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 21 
Don't know: 10 
06/1961 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own nuclear 
weapons: 35 
Pool all nuclear weapons with 
other NATO countries and rely 
mainly on American 
production: 30 
Given up nuclear weapons 
entirely: 20 
Don't know: 15 
12/1962 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own: 33 
Set up European nuclear force: 
16 






05/1963 What policy should Britain follow about nuclear 
weapons? 
Continue to make 
our own: 39 
Set up European nuclear force: 
15 






Giving up nuclear weapons 
10/1961 Would you approve or disapprove if Britain gave up her 
H-bombs even if other countries did not do so? 
Approve: 21 Disapprove: 62 Don't know: 17 
12/1961 Would you approve or disapprove if Britain gave up her 
H-bombs even if other countries did not do so? 
Approve: 31 Disapprove: 55 Don't know: 14 
05-06/1962 Would you approve or disapprove if Britain gave up her 
H-bombs even if other countries did not do so? 
Approve: 22 Disapprove: 64 Don't know: 14 




Rely on them in some way: 54 Don't know: 17 
06/1967 A prominent American official has said in this country 
that we should give up our atom bomb and rely on the 
U.S.A. for our defence. Would you approve or 
disapprove if we gave up our atom bomb? 
Approve: 19 Disapprove: 69 Don’t know: 12 
  











Appendix Effects of political preferences, foreign policy attitudes, and ‘gender gap’ on attitudes toward 
keeping nuclear weapons  














(without EU Ref 
choice) 
 






























































































































































































































N 1,579 1,579 1,485 1,572 1,746 
